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Abstract 
 
Tonga’s monetary authority, National Reserve Bank of Tonga (NRBT) is entrusted with 
the responsibility of managing Tonga’s monetary system and exchange rate stability. This 
paper undertakes an empirical study of monetary policies pursued by NRBT with specific 
focus on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in Tonga.  As the annual data 
time series cover only a short-period (1981-2008), we resort to bounds testing approach.  
The study findings show that monetary aggregate in Tonga is more important than short-
term interest rate as a channel in transmitting impulses from the monetary sector to the 
real sector.  
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Monetary Policy Transmission in Tonga1 
 
T.K. Jayaraman 
Chee-Keong Choong 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Amongst the 14 Pacific island countries2 (PICs), eight PICs are dollarised3 economies 
using one or the other of the three currencies of the metropolitan countries in the region, 
as legal tender.  The other six countries have their own independent currencies. Five of 
them, namely Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Vanuatu, have a fixed exchange 
rate regime, while Papua New Guinea has a floating exchange rate regime.    
 
Prior to the establishment of National Reserve Bank of Tonga (NRBT) in 1989 under the 
NRBT Act of 1988 with the main objectives of promoting monetary stability and the 
soundness of the financial system, and fostering conditions for economic development 
and growth, monetary policy was administered by the Treasury and the Bank of Tonga, a 
government owned bank to undertake certain central banking functions. Monetary 
stability, as a goal, includes price stability in terms of low inflation as well external 
stability of the pa’anga, the domestic currency. About two-thirds of the items in the 
consumer price index basket are dominated by imported goods. The NRBT, which is 
intensely aware that that exchange rate stability is critical for maintaining domestic price 
stability, as there is a high pass through of the exchange rate to the price level, aims at 
maintaining gross foreign reserves equivalent to three months of total imports or above. 
The NRBT pursues these objectives with instruments of monetary policy, direct and 
indirect, with mixed success. These include statutory reserve requirement ratio and credit 
control measures as well open market operations in the NRBT issued securities, until 
May 2009, which were replaced by government treasury bills. There are no studies so far 
undertaken on monetary policy transmission in Tonga. The present paper seeks to fill the 
gap. Since the data available cover only a 28-year period (1981-2008), we employ the 
bounds testing approach which does not require large sample size data as well as other 
stricter requirements in regard to order of integration of variables employed.  The paper is 
organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background of Tongan economy and monetary 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to Mrs. Siosi C. Mafi, Governor, National Reserve Bank of Tonga for her 
comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper.     
 
2 The 14 PICs are: Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. These 14 PICs, 
together with two metropolitan countries, namely Australia and New Zealand form the regional inter- 
governmental organization, known as Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum).  
 
3 The eight dollarized economies, using one of the three major currencies as legal tender, are: Kiribati, 
Nauru, and Tuvalu (Aus$); Cook Islands and Niue (NZ$), Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia 
and Palau (US$).  
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policy instruments employed by NRBT.  Section 3 is a short summary of the various 
transmission mechanisms as studied in advanced and developing economies and their 
limitations when applied to island economies; Section 4 deals with the methodology 
adopted for the empirical analysis; Section 5 reports the results; and Section 6 presents 
conclusions with policy implications.      
 
2.  A Background 
 
Tonga (population 102,000), whose selected key indicators are given in Table 1 shares 
many commonalities with rest of PICs.  Tonga is heavily subsistence oriented, providing 
livelihood to 80 percent of the population.  Its manufacturing base is small, which is 
confined to processing coconut oil based soaps and detergents, and biscuits and breads.  
 
Table 1:  Tonga:  selected key indicators 
Land Area (Sq.km.'000) 0.72 
Population (2006: '000) 104 
Per Capita GDP (US$) Current Prices (2008) 2,548 
Aid Per Capita in US$ (2007) 296 
Aid as percentage of GDP (2007) 12.0 
Annual Average Growth Rate in percent (2001-2008) 1.4 
Annual Average Inflation in percent (2001-2008)  9.0 
Overall Budget Balance as percent of GDP (2001-2007) 0.4 
Current Account Balance as percent of GDP (2001-2007) -6.6 
Source: World Bank (2008), UNESCAP (2007) 
 
Tonga’s fixed exchange rate regime has served the country well. Since most of the 
imports have been sourced from Australia and New Zealand, whose monetary policies 
have been targeting inflation, inflation has been kept low.  Being a small country with no 
mineral resources and limited commercial agriculture and negligible manufacturing base, 
Tonga is heavily dependent on imports ranging from food and beverages, to fuel and 
capital and transportation machinery and equipment. Exports have been bananas, squash 
and copra and fish.  Export earnings have been far less than imports with the result that 
the trade balance has always remained negative. However, remittances from Tongans 
who are resident in New Zealand, USA and Australia, tourism receipts, and regular 
annual aid inflows have been a great source of support to country’s current account 
balance, minimising the pressures on exchange rate.  
 
Macroeconomic performance 
 
While the 1970s were characterized by relatively favourable macroeconomic conditions, 
economic situation in the 1980s and mid 1990s deteriorated.  As Australia and New 
Zealand liberalised their imports of vegetables from rest of the world, Tonga ceased to 
enjoy the special treatment accorded to its exports of bananas and copra. However, 
emergence of squash as exports to Japan as an off season crop brought in the next few 
years a sustained level of export earnings. In the 1990s, Government announced its 
strategy of promoting manufacturing through tax holidays and tariff preferences. 
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However, after initial rise in domestic production, exports did not take off.  The second-
half of the 1990s and early years of 2000 witnessed a weakened budget discipline and 
policy slippages and poor governance threatened macroeconomic stability. Losses in the 
US stock market due to risky management of investments led to depletion of the Tonga 
Trust Fund, which was built through country’s official reserves, amounting at one time to 
20 percent of GDP (Singh 2006).  
 
With limited monetary policy instruments, Tonga relied primarily on movements in 
foreign exchange reserves as indicators of the appropriateness of monetary policy. The 
NRBT resorted to moral suasion and persuaded the commercial banks to restrict lending. 
However, political developments since early 2000 slowed down economic growth, while  
adverse terms of trade shocks as well as rise in fuel and food prices contributed to rise in 
inflation. Pro-democracy riots that led to the burning and looting of the capital in 
November 2006 were estimated to have resulted in losses of nearly US$60 million or 
about 30 percent of GDP). Despite a modest recovery following a rise in tourism and 
remittances and aid-funded construction activities, the economy shrank in 2007 by 3.5 
percent (AusAID 2008). Although expansionary measures including fiscal deficits and 
monetary easing were appropriate to revive the economy in 2007, there were inflationary 
pressures lurking around the corner.  
 
In mid 2008, worldwide increase in food prices as well as fuel and subsequent volatility 
in fuel prices exposed the weaknesses in handling the unforeseen impact on balance of 
payments. Along with inflation, decline in reserves was causing concerns. Although real 
exchange appreciated by 13 percent during the 2003-2007 due to domestic inflation 
relative to inflation in trading partners, government was not keen to adjust nominal 
exchange rate, as there is no visible advantage in depreciation of the currency. Already 
exports of squash to the niche market in Japan had weakened and Tonga’s exports were 
only just 10 percent of total imports. Thus, containing inflation was a priority rather than 
promoting competitiveness of limited exports. Any further depreciation of nominal 
currency was likely to raise prices of imports of fertilizers and insecticides and other 
inputs which go into production of vegetables and fruits and squash, aside from 
increasing landed prices of all critical imports.   
 
The policy actions now require coordination between finance ministry and monetary 
authorities to contain fiscal deficits by resisting any temptation to yield to pressures from 
civil service for wage rise and minimize deficit financing needs so that the objectives of 
monetary and exchange rate stability are within reach.   
 
 
3. Monetary Policy Formulation and Implementation 
 
Structure of the financial system and market 
 
As of December 2008, Tonga’s financial sector consists of five institutions: the NRBT, 
three commercial banks, and one state-owned development bank (Table 2). Until 1993 
only two banks operated in Tonga, including a state-owned development bank established 
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to promote rural development by investing resources obtained mainly from external 
borrowing. Another of the commercial banks established in 1993 was a branch of a 
foreign bank; the other was a locally incorporated bank. A small insurance sector 
completes the financial sector. 
Table 2: Tonga: Financial System Structure  
 Assets 
(Millions of 
pa’anga) 
Percent in 
Total Assets 
Percent of 
GDP 
Number of 
Institutions 
Commercial banks 200.4 81.6 72.3 3 
State-owned 
development bank 
45.1 18.4 16.3 1 
Insurance companies n.a. n.a. n.a. 6 
Total 245.5 100.0 88.6 10 
Source: IMF (2008) 
 
Banking activities are largely confined to urban centres, where formal sector activities are 
concentrated. The deepening process of financial sector over the period, as reflected in 
the ratios of narrow and broad money, has been slow. As Tonga has no vibrant bond and 
equity markets, there are no attractive financial assets other than saving and time deposits 
for savers to invest in. Table 3 presents monetary statistics of Tonga. 
 
Following liberalisation of the economy in general and financial sectors, with 
discontinuance of controls on lending and deposit rates from the late 1980s, the ratio of 
broad money to GDP has been on the rise.   
 
Table 3: Tonga: Monetary Statistics 
Year 
RGDP 
Growth 
Rate (%) 
M2 (as 
ratio of 
GDP) 
( %) 
Inflation 
(%) 
Deposit 
Rate 
( %) 
Lending 
Rate 
( %) 
Exchange 
Rate  
( index) 
(US $/ 
Pa'aanga) 
1981-85 (ave) 3.76 28.51 10.48 6.25 10.00 97.73 
1986-90 (ave) 0.31 31.48 10.01 6.48 11.05 110.69 
1991-95 ( ave) 3.66 31.04 4.39 5.27 11.55 115.03 
1996-2000 
(ave) 1.79 36.77 3.83 5.50 11.21 124.37 
2001 3.06 45.58 8.30 5.47 11.34 145.31 
2002 1.67 44.69 10.36 5.47 11.40 139.20 
2003 3.06 44.47 11.64 5.47 11.34 122.19 
2004 1.13 47.54 10.98 5.85 11.59 111.79 
2005 -3.27 52.56 8.32 5.90 11.38 109.25 
2006 4.38 51.97 6.44 6.58 11.97 110.64 
2007 -0.28 53.84 5.89 6.77 12.16 102.44 
2008 1.20 50.72 10.44 6.53 12.46 101.33 
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.  
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Monetary framework 
 
Tonga’s monetary policy is implemented in the context of a fixed exchange rate 
arrangement according to which the value of the pa’anga is determined based on a 
weighted basket of currencies comprising the Australian dollar, the Japanese yen, the 
New Zealand dollar, and the U.S. dollar.4 The exchange rate is managed on a day-to-day 
basis by NRBT on the basis of the movement of the basket of currencies. Since there are 
foreign exchange control regulations in place, Tonga has some measure of monetary 
policy independence. 
The principal objectives of NRBT as defined by the NRBT Act5, include regulation of 
issue of currency, and supply and availability of exchange of money; managing the 
external reserves; promoting monetary stability and the soundness of the financial 
system; and fostering conditions for economic development. The NRBT aims at 
maintaining low inflation, and gross foreign reserves equivalent to three months of total 
imports or above. Thus, NRBT recognizes that exchange stability is essential for the price 
stability in Tonga given the high pass-through of the exchange rate to the price level 
given that more than two thirds of the items on the CPI basket are composed of imported 
goods.  
The NRBT Governor is appointed for a period of five years and is eligible for 
reappointment. Responsibility for policy and affairs lies with the Board of Directors, 
which comprises the Governor and six other directors who are appointed by government. 
The NRBT pursues these objectives in close consultation with the government and most 
changes in monetary and exchange rate operations require government approval. In order 
to improve transparency of monetary policy measures and accountability of NRBT for 
the conduct of its policies, amendments to the 1988 Act introduced in 2007 require 
NRBT issue a monetary policy statement every six months.  
The amended legislation also enables NRBT to conduct its monetary policy with greater 
autonomy. The NRBT makes currency adjustments not only on the basis of competitive 
advantage only but also on the basis of factors including inflationary impact). Earlier, 
Furthermore, NRBT was under frequent strain when it had to pick up the unsold 
government bonds issued to finance annual budget deficits. Since the amendment of the 
Act, NRBT cannot and does not underwrite or pick up unsold government bonds. 
Consequently, in the past reserve money creation through monetization of deficits hads 
contributed to the excess liquidity. Since NRBT has limited monetary policy instruments 
to mop up surplus funds in the system, inflation has been a recurrent phenomenon.  
                                                 
4 The pa’anga was pegged to the Australian dollar until 1991. The Asian crisis and the sharp drop in 
reserves in 1997–98 led the authorities to introduce a 2 percent band in March 1998. In 2000, the band was 
widened to 5 percent and the Japanese yen was included in the currency basket since Japan became more 
important as a trading partne. 
5  Section 4 of NRBT Act of 1988. 
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Monetary policy instruments of a central bank are generally categorized into two: (i) 
ruled-based instruments6, which are based on the regulatory power of the central bank 
and (ii) indirect instruments7, which are linked to money market operations. When the 
central bank uses its regulatory powers, its aim is to change the balance sheets of 
commercial banks. By so doing, there is one to one correspondence effect between, say 
credit ceiling and commercial loans.  On the other hand, when central bank uses indirect 
instruments, the objective is to change its own balance sheet. For example, if central bank 
conducts open market sale of its own security, it acquires additional reserves, thereby 
absorbing the targeted excess surplus funds from the economy. If there is a stable 
relationship between reserve money and aggregate demand, indirect instrument will be 
effective.    
The NRBT relied solely on direct instruments until mid 1990s (Box 1).  The SRD ratio 
stands at 5 percent, having been reduced from 10 percent in 2009 as a measure tdo fight 
recessionary conditions following the global economic downturn.  In 1993, NRBT 
embarked on open market operations (OMO) by auctioning the 28-day central bank 
paper, known as NRBT Notes. However, NRBT’s OMO came to a halt in 2001, due to 
financial losses, mainly arising out of mounting interest payment obligations as well as 
rise in administrative costs. Since the government was unable to support the central bank 
in its liquidity management operations by meeting the OMO costs, NRBT experienced 
ultimate deterioration in its capital base (IMF 2006).  
 
With some improvement in its own finances, NRBT resumed OMO in its paper in 2007. 
But success was eluding. With excess liquidity caused by frequent monetization of 
annual fiscal deficits had been causing problems. IMF (2008) observed that a continued 
reliance on NRBT Notes would only result in increased costs of operating cost, which in 
the absence of government support for meeting the inflationary pressures created in the 
first place by its own fiscal excesses, would only undermine the central bank financial 
position. NRBT Notes have now been discontinued since May 2009.     
   
In addition to the excess liquidity created by monetization of fiscal deficits on a regular 
basis, there is also the phenomenon of structural excess liquidity, which is prevalent in 
economies with shallow financial markets characterized by a small number of 
participants. In such economies as in Tonga and other island countries, IMF (2004, 2005) 
                                                 
6 The rules-based instruments include: (i) liquid asset ratio, a requirement for a bank to hold minimum 
amounts of specified liquid assets, typically as a percentage of its liabilities; (ii) reserve requirements, a 
requirements for a bank to hold minimum balances with the central bank, typically as a percentage of its 
liabilities; and (iii) standing facilities, which are monetary instruments used at the initiative of banks and 
bearing a pre-specified interest rate, allowing banks to borrow from (refinance facility) or deposit funds 
with the central bank (deposit facility).  
7 Indirect instruments are linked to money market conditions. These are used at the discretion of the central 
bank. They include: open market operations, which are monetary operations conducted by the central bank 
as a participant in the money market. They involve: (i) buying/selling bonds issued by government and 
government agencies on the secondary market; and buying/selling assets under a repurchase agreement in 
the repo market, or foreign exchange swaps; and (ii) open market-type operations, which are monetary 
operations based on auction techniques that are regulated by the central bank. They involve primary market 
issuance of central bank’s own securities or government securities issued exclusively for monetary policy 
purposes (IMF 2004) 
  
 
9
notes that OMO in either government issued securities or the central bank’s own paper 
would result in overshooting of interest rates and market volatility. In these 
circumstances, it has been recommended by IMF (2008) that direct instruments such as 
SRD and liquidity asset ratio (LAR) and other direct instruments, including credit 
ceilings and moral suasion, all aimed at effecting immediate changes in banks’ balance 
sheets be used, as they would be more effective since they directly affect the volume of 
liquidity. Experiences of other PICs are also relevant here8. 
 
 
Box 1. Tonga: Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
Credit ceilings  
They are imposed on the private sector credit of each individual bank. Credit ceilings are 
set quarterly by the NRBT and they have been the main monetary policy instruments in 
Tonga since 2000 until early 2007. 
 
Reserve requirements 
Introduced in 1993; they are not remunerated. The ratio was raised from 5 to 10 percent 
in 1996, to 12 percent in 1998, and to 15 percent in 2000. The ratio was reduced to 12.5% 
in 2006, to 10% in 2007, and to 5% in 2009. 
 
Standing facilities 
Short-term liquidity facility: Allows the banks to borrow from the NRBT for a short term 
(normally for less than a month), using government bonds or the NRBT notes as collateral. 
The discount rate charged by the NRBT on these short-term loans was 17 percent per year 
during the first 10 days, and 19 percent thereafter, as of August 2002 until 2006. In 
December 29, 2006, the repo rate was reduced to 12%. Repo rate was set at 2% above 
inter-bank rate or 10% per annum whichever is higher. Repo rate was reduced to 10% in 
August 2008, to 6% in March 2009, and to 4.5% in May 2009. 
 
Money market instruments 
Reserve Bank Notes: NRBT Notes were introduced in 1993; they were discontinued 
in 2001 owing to high operating costs. NRBT reintroduced its 28-day Reserve Bank Notes 
in 2006; they were discontinued in March 2007; reintroduced in October 2008 and again 
discontinued in May 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
8 IMF (2004) reports that soon after the 1998 crisis caused by a run on Vanuatu National Provident Fund 
and the resultant rise in liquidity, Reserve Bank of Vanuatu had to rely on direct instruments, including 
LAR and credit ceilings for controlling liquidity.  Fiji resorted to raising SRD from 5 percent to 6 percent 
and imposed credit controls (Jayaraman and Choong 2009).  IMF (2005) cites the experiences of both 
developed countries and developing countries in other regions: use of reserve requirements (Spain), 
mandatory deposits (Mexico and the Netherlands) and moving deposits from commercial banks to the 
central bank (Malaysia and Thailand)    
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Although expansionary policies, including monetary easing in 2007 were appropriate to 
facilitate recovery of the economy from the after-effects of riots, lurking inflationary 
pressures due to volatility in fuel prices and rising food prices in 2008 caused concerns to 
policy makers. By July 2008, the Tongan economy was on a modest path to recovery, as 
growth was spurred by new investments financed by high lending growth. 
Simultaneously, imports increased and inflation rose, once again exerting pressures on 
foreign reserves. Although large aid inflows reversed this trend later, NRBT was aware 
of leading to more inflation and higher imports unless growth in lending is curbed. The 
NRBT has been using moral suasion to convey the message that domestic banks should 
“manage their lending prudently against the quality of their portfolio and their future 
payments obligations to ensure that adequate liquidity is maintained in the banking 
system at all times” (NRBT 2008). 
 
Aside from NRBT closely monitoring the growth in lending against foreign payments 
obligations by the financial system and issuing NRBT notes to ensure financial stability 
and maintenance of adequate foreign reserves, both finance ministry and central bank 
have to coordinate their actions to minimize pressures on public finances, as civil service 
is pressing the government for increasing the wage bill, and consequent impact on 
balance of payments and reserve position.  
 
4.  Monetary Policy Transmission: A Brief Literature Survey 
 
Monetary policy transmission is described a process through which monetary policy 
changes decisions are expected to influence aggregate demand, output and price level in 
economy (Meltzer 1995). The impact of monetary policy decision on the country’s GDP 
domestic product is through its influences on consumption and investment decisions of 
households, business and financial intermediaries. At least six channels through which 
monetary policy impacts economic activities have been identified. These include: (i) 
interest rate channel; (ii) money supply channel; (iii) credit channel; (iv) the balance 
sheet channel; (v) asset price channel; (vi) exchange rate channel; and (vii) expectations 
channel (Mishkin 2006, 2001, 1996, 1995).  
 
Interest Rate Channel 
 
The traditional view is that a fall in nominal interest rate, following a rise in nominal 
money stock, given the unchanged price level in the short run due to market rigidities, 
and hence a fall in real interest rate, would cause rise in investment spending, thereby 
increasing aggregate demand and rise in output.  The key here is that it is fall in the real 
cost of borrowing that would promote investment. Taylor (1995) in his survey on 
empirical research studies on interest rate channel concluded that there is strong empirical 
evidence for substantial effects on consumer spending on semi-durables and investment 
spending, making the interest rate monetary transmission mechanism a strong one.  
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Money Supply Channel   
 
The money supply channel view is that an expansionary monetary policy increases bank 
reserves and relaxes the constraints to banks’ ability to create more loans and as a result 
short-term interest rate falls (King 1986, Ramey 1993, Romer and Romer 1990, Thornton 
1994).  Here, money supply expansion would mean increases either in M1, narrow 
money (comprising currency outside the banks and demand deposits) or M2, broad 
(consisting of narrow money and savings and time deposits).  
 
Credit Channel 
 
Increase in money supply through rise in bank reserves would raise the ability of banks to 
expand lending. Banks would make available loans to new borrowers as well, most of 
whom are dependent on bank loans. This will encourage further consumption spending in 
terms of purchases of semi-durables and business investment. The bank credit channel 
has assumed greater importance in recent years, not only in advanced but also in 
developing economies as documented in studies by Bernanke (1986), Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988), Kashyap et al. (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1994).  
 
Balance Sheet Channel 
 
The balance sheet channel view lays emphasis on the role of collateral in reducing moral 
hazards. An expansionary monetary policy causes increases in financial and physical 
asset prices, thereby raising the market net worth of firms and the value of collateral, 
company cash flow and ultimately the firms’ credit worthiness.  Further, a rise in asset 
prices increases the ratio of liquid financial assets to household debt, thereby reducing the 
probability of financial distress and therefore increases consumption and housing 
investment (Mishkin 2001).   
   
Asset Price Channel 
 
This particular transmission channel rests on Tobin’s q theory, which is applied to 
business investment (Mishkin 1995, 2001, 2006).  An expansionary monetary policy 
raises price level of equities. Increase in its stock prices enables the firm to raise 
additional equity capital by issuing less number of stocks.  Transmission mechanism 
through asset price increases is further strengthened by Modigliani’s life cycle model, 
according to which increases in financial wealth raises consumption by households 
(Mishkin 1995, 2001, 2006).   
 
Exchange Rate Channel 
 
Monetary policy influences the exchange rate through interest rates. An expansionary 
monetary policy would increase money supply, leading to a fall in interest rate. Under 
conditions of perfect capital mobility and perfect substitutability of financial assets, 
capital would flow out and domestic currency would depreciate. Depreciation would 
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make the country’s exports more attractive to foreigners; an increase in net exports would 
result in greater aggregate demand leading to rise in output (Mishkin 2006).   
 
Expectations Channel 
 
Monetary policy decisions have an impact on the economy through their influence on the 
expectations of economic agents about the future outlook of the economy. In particular, 
expectation effects may improve monetary policy transmission channels by shortening 
reaction lags (Mayes 2004). The expectation channel is likely to be more effective, if the 
central bank has already acquired a high degree of credibility through its past 
performance.  
   
Limitations in the island economies 
 
There are constraints limiting the efficiency of transmission mechanisms acting through 
various channels. One of the constraints faced by Tonga and other PICs is the absence of 
a well-developed and deep financial sector and a vibrant secondary market, in which 
financial assets could be traded with considerable ease and speed, interest rate channel 
does not effectively operate (Worrell 2000, Fairbairn and Worrell 1996). 
 
The balance sheet approach presupposes that financial assets are important constituents 
of firms’/consumers’ portfolios and assumes the existence of convertibility between 
illiquid (consumer durables) and liquid (financial) assets. Empirical studies have shown 
that markets for assets in the PICs and the Caribbean region have not attained such 
sophistication to function as an efficient conduit for monetary policy (Baksh and 
Craigwell 1997).  A recent study (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeir 2006) notes that the 
inability of banks in developing countries to properly assess credit risk, due to both weak 
risk management expertise and opaque corporate accounting practices, increases banking 
spreads and reduces the effectiveness of balance sheet channel.  
 
 With reference to asset price channel mechanism and its variants of Tobin’s q theory 
(valuation of equities), the required pre-condition, namely the presence of financial assets 
constituting a key component of borrowers’ and wealth holders’ portfolios, does not exist 
in any PICs, including Tonga. Commercial banks dominate the financial sector, since the 
non-bank financial sector institutions (stock, debt securities and mortgage market, 
insurance industry) are still in their infancy. Thus, market financing does not matter, 
which largely precludes the asset price channel’s working through wealth and income 
effects (Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeir 2006). 
 
The exchange rate channel transmission mechanism for its full efficiency presupposes a 
floating system, which adjusts to capital flows. Since Tonga has adopted a fixed 
exchange rate regime, this particular channel does not operate. In view of the constraints 
discussed above, it is more likely that in small island economies with undeveloped money 
markets, monetary pulses are transmitted to the real sector through money channel rather 
than through interest rate channel. The next section is devoted to testing the hypothesis 
that money channel is more effective than interest channel. 
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5. Variables, Data and Methodology 
 
For our empirical study, the choice of variables is severely constrained by data 
deficiencies. Further, the number of annual observations is also small. Therefore, the 
model has to remain simple.  For analysis, we choose two policy variables, monetary 
aggregate and interest rate. Monetary aggregate can be represented by narrow or broad 
money. Interest rate is proxied by average lending rate, since there is no consistent data 
series for short-term rate Accordingly, the variables utilized in our empirical study 
include real gross domestic product (RGDP), either of the two monetary aggregate 
measure (M1, M2)9, consumer price index (P), average nominal lending rate (IR); and 
nominal exchange rate (units of US dollar per unit of domestic currency). The annual 
data for the empirical study are drawn from two sources: the monetary and exchange rate 
data from International Financial Statistics published by International Monetary Fund 
(2008) and output data from Asian Development Bank (2008) and UN ESCAP (2008). 
Table 4 presents data series employed in the study. 
 
Bounds testing approach  
 
The data series for Tonga cover a 28-year period (1981-2008).   Since the number of 
observations is not large enough for estimating a long-run money and output model, we 
resort to the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) procedure, developed by Pesaran, et 
al. (2001). The ARDL bounds testing model is a general dynamic specification, which 
applies lags of the dependent variable and the lagged and contemporaneous values of the 
explanatory variables, through which the short-run impacts can be directly estimated, and 
the long-run relationship can be indirectly estimated. For econometric analysis, all 
variables are duly transformed into their natural logs. We also add a trend variable10.   
 
Bound test with ARDL framework has several advantages: (i) it allows testing for the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between variables in levels irrespective of 
whether the underlying regressors are I(0) or I(1) (Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran et al., 
2001); (ii) it is considered more appropriate than the Johansen-Juselius multivariate 
approach for testing the long run relationship amongst variables when the data are of a 
small sample size (Mah, 2000)11; (iii) Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that estimators of 
                                                 
9 M1 is the sum of currency in circulation plus demand deposits held with commercial banks by the rest of 
the domestic economy other than the central bank. M2 is M1 plus savings and time deposits. We tried both 
M1 and M2 (broad money), alternately representing the monetary aggregate.  
10 Narayan and Smyth (2006) have extensively discussed the inclusion of time trend variable in the 
estimation. 
 
11Some previous studies have used ARDL model to relatively small sample sizes with as few as 20 
observations in their research. For example, Pattichis (1999) apply the ARDL model to estimate an import 
demand function for Cyprus from 1975 to 1994 (20 observations). Tang (2001) applies the ARDL 
framework to study inflation in Malaysia for the period of 1973-1997 (25 observations) while Tang and 
Nair (2002) apply the ARDL technique to estimate an import demand function for Malaysia from 1970 to 
1998 (29 observations). 
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the short-run parameters are consistent and the estimators of long-run parameters are 
super-consistent in small sample sizes.  
 
There are two steps involved in estimating the long-run relationship between money, 
output and other variables. The first step is to examine the presence of a long-run 
relationship among all variables in the equation. Once the long run relationship is 
confirmed in the model, the long-run coefficients are estimated using the associated 
ARDL model. To examine for cointegration by the bounds test proposed by Pesaran et 
al., the following models are constructed.  
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where Δ  is the first difference operator, and the itε  are white noise error terms. The joint 
significance of the lagged levels in these equations is examined using the F-test, where 
the null and alternative hypotheses are expressed as follows: 
 
For Equations (1) to (5): 
0: 543210 ===== iiiiiH βββββ  (there is no long-run level relationship)  
0: 543211 ≠≠≠≠≠ iiiiiH βββββ  (there is a long-run level relationship) 
 
where 5,...,2,1=i  
 
The distribution of the F-statistics is non-standard under the null and is derived and 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). Two sets of critical values are given based on Pesaran, 
et al. (2001) and Narayan (2005). Narayan and Narayan (2005) and Narayan (2005) show 
that the use of Pesaran, et al.’s (2001) critical values for small sample study may lead 
misleading inferences as the computed critical values are generally lower than those 
generated by Narayan who used similar GAUSS code provided by Pesaran, et al. (2001). 
Narayan (2005) has generated a set of critical values for small sample size ranging from 
30 to 80 observations. Since the sample size in our study is small, and as the critical 
values provided by Pesaran, et al. (2001) are calculated on the basis of large sample sizes 
of 500 and 1000 observations and 2000 and 40000 replications respectively, we use the 
critical values generated by Narayan (2005) 12. 
 
If the computed F-statistic is greater than the upper critical bound value, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected irrespective of whether the variable is I(0) or 
I(1). In contrast, when the F-statistic is smaller than the lower critical bound value, the 
null hypothesis is not rejected, and we conclude that there is no long-run level 
relationship between the variables under study. However, if the computed F-statistic lies 
inside the lower and upper critical bound values, there is inconclusive inference unless 
the order of integration of the series under consideration is clearly examined.   
 
Granger causality test  
 
If the variables are cointegrated, the next step is to perform the Granger causality test to 
examine the short-run dynamic causality relationship between variables.  Equations (1) to 
(5) can be re-formulated into a vector error-correction model (VECM) framework in 
order to capture the short- and long-run effect of the cointegrating vector.  Let tZ  as the 
                                                 
12 See Table 2 for these critical values.  
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vector of a set of endogenous variables, we can model tZ  as an unrestricted vector 
autoregression (VAR) model with optimum lag-length13:  
 ),0(~...2211 σINUwhereUZAZAZAZ ttktkttt ++++= −−−   (6) 
where tZ  is (5 x 1) vector comprised of LRGDP, LP, LM2, LIR and LER. Each of the iA  
is (5 x 5) matrix of parameters. The 5-variable VAR model as shown in Equation (6) is 
used if no long run relationship in the bound testing approach.  Nevertheless, if there 
appears a cointegration vector, then the following VECM will be used to examine the 
long- and short-run causality relationship between variables under study.  
 tktttt UZZZZ +Π++ΔΓ+ΔΓ=Δ −−− ...2211     (7) 
where tZΔ = [LRGDP, LP, LM2, LIR and LER]’, )(),( 21211 AAIAI −−−=Γ−−=Γ  and 
)( 321 AAAI −−−−=Π . iΓ  reflects the short-run relationship of the changes in tZ .  The 
(5 x 5) matrix of Π  (= 'αβ ) contains both speed of adjustment to disequilibrium (α ) and 
the long-run information ( β ) such that the term 3' −tZβ  embedded in Equation (7) 
represents the (n-1) cointegrating relationship in the model.  
 
 
6. Results and Discussions 
 
Unit root tests  
 
We use three testing procedures for examining the order of integration of each series. The 
first test is proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979, ADF) with the null hypothesis of 
contain a unit root process. However, one of the problems with the ADF tests is that the 
test has low power in examining the properties of the series.  Indeed, Pantula, et al. 
(1994) have argued that unit root tests based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimator such as ADF tests, are the least powerful among the test statistics they 
examined. Hence, we also apply unit root test proposed by Ng and Perron (2001). The 
test suggested by Ng and Perron (2001) has a similar null hypothesis as ADF test. Table 4 
reports the results for three unit root tests, both on levels and in first differences of the 
variables. There is strong evidence to conclude that the series are non-stationary in their 
levels but stationary in first difference.  
 
Cointegration test  
 
Adopting the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model proposed by Pesaran, et al. 
(2001), we proceed to test the long-run cointegration hypothesis between LRGDP), LP, 
LM2, LIR and LER. The results of cointegration test are reported in Table 5. The 
estimated coefficients of the long-run parameters have the theoretically expected correct 
signs. The explanatory variables are statistically significant at the 5 per cent level or 
better, except for exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
13 The optimum lag length is chosen based on the Akaike’s information criterion.  
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Table 4: The results of unit root tests  
ADF Ng and Perron ERS Variable 
Level First 
Difference
Level First 
Difference 
Level First 
Difference 
LRGDP -2.5101 -4.5885** -9.3994 -12.6951** 9.4827 2.6801** 
LP -1.6323 -3.4468** -5.4411 -10.5867** 14.8291 2.3034** 
LM2 -2.1031 -4.7478** -4.9167 -11.0754** 19.6802 2.5756** 
LIR -3.3778 -4.3883** -7.7511 -12.4575** 10.9876 1.8993** 
LER -2.4572 -3.3057** -13.6198 -9.6340** 6.4833 2.7961** 
Notes: The ADF critical values are based on Mckinnon. The optimal lag is chosen on the basis of 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The null hypothesis for both ADF and Ng-Perron tests is a series 
has a unit root (non-stationary) while the null hypothesis of the KPSS test is does not contain unit root 
(stationary).  
The asterisk ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  
 
Table 5: Bound test for Tonga 
Dependent 
Variable 
 Computd F-statistic 
LRGDP  8.895*** 
LP  1.506 
LM2  1.328 
LIR  0.954 
LER  1.085 
 Pesaran, et al. (2001)a Narayan (2005)b 
Critical 
Value 
Lower 
bound value 
Upper 
bound value 
Lower 
bound value 
Upper 
bound value 
1 per cent 3.41 4.68 4.537 6.370 
5 per cent 2.62 3.79 3.125 4.608 
10 per cent 2.26 3.35 2.578 3.858 
a Critical values are obtained from Pesaran, et al. (2001), Table CI(iii) Case III: Unrestricted 
intercept and no trend, p. 300. 
b Critical values are obtained from Narayan (2005), Table case III: unrestricted intercept and no 
trend, p. 10.  
*, ** and ***  indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
The results indicate that coefficients of both interest rate and exchange rate are not 
significant. The estimated coefficient of price index has a negative sign and is found 
statistically significant, while the coefficient of monetary aggregate is positively 
associated with output and is also significant. Specifically, the magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient of M2, which denotes elasticity of RGDP with respect to M2,  suggests that a 
1% increase in M2 would lead to about 0.361% increase in real output.  
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The results of bounds test for LRGDP equation, shown in Table 4, pass all the diagnostic 
tests such as Breusch-Godfrey LM test (serial correlation), ARCH test 
(heteroscedasticity), Ramsey RESET test (functional form misspecification) and Jarque-
Bera (normality) test. Further, cumulative sum (CUSUM) and cumulative sum of squares 
(CUSUMSQ) stability tests (Figures 2 and 3) suggest that all the estimated coefficients in 
the estimated LRGDP regression are stable over the sample period.  
 
Granger causality test 
 
In order to examine the dynamic causal relationship between the macroeconomic 
variables, we use the Granger causality test within parsimonious vector error correction 
model (PVECM). The error correction term (ECT) for LRGDP equation, which measures 
the speed at which LRGDP adjusts to changes in price, money variable, interest rate and 
exchange rate before converging to its long-run equilibrium level, is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level. The ECT has the correct sign, suggesting that the 
variable is non-explosive and the long-run steady state equilibrium is attainable. The 
magnitude of ECT (-0.1553) implies a slow speed of adjustment to equilibrium following 
a shock, that is, about 16 per cent of disparity of the current year’s shock revert back to 
its long-run equilibrium within the next year. The ECTs for other equations are not 
statistically significant, although they have the correct negative signs. The results confirm 
the existence of only one cointegrating vector and that there is linkage running only from 
money and other explanatory variables to output.  
 
Table 6: Granger causality test for Tonga 
F-statistics Dependent 
Variable  ΔLRGDP ΔLP ΔLM2 ΔLIR ΔLER 
ECT (t-
statistics)
ΔLRGDP - 
7.7306*** 9.8009*** 9.2368*** 12.4039*** 
-0.1553* 
(-1.9041) 
ΔLP 
4.1644* 
- 
17.9505*** 1.5877 6.9994** 
-0.0951 
(-1.6028) 
ΔLM2 
0.7631 2.4896 
- 
1.3208 0.2909 
-0.6901 
(-0.7336) 
ΔLIR 
7.6422*** 2.2797 3.2806* 
- 
2.8711 
-0.3811 
(-0.7474) 
ΔLER 
4.1780* 5.3782* 5.0283* 2.7755 
- -0.5253 
(-1.7107) 
Note:  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
 
As regards short-run causality relationships, we observe the linkage runs from money 
variable to output, price, interest rate and exchange rate. Additionally, there is bi-
directional causality exists between real output and price, real output and exchange rate, 
and exchange rate and price. Hence, changes in money variable are seen to have 
significant effects on real output establishing the role of money in stabilizing and 
controlling economic activity.  
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Table 7: Results of Variance Decomposition Analysis 
Period S.E. LRGDP LP LM2 LIR LER 
Variance Decomposition of LRGDP: 
1 0.0257 35.7667 0.0964 32.2081 4.7112 27.2176 
2 0.0344 21.3342 1.1548 58.9493 2.9757 15.5860 
3 0.0397 19.4264 2.5010 55.9155 2.2814 19.8757 
4 0.0415 17.8007 2.8761 56.9285 2.3960 19.9988 
5 0.0453 14.9505 4.1099 62.0217 2.0128 16.9051 
6 0.0508 13.4794 3.2903 58.8512 1.7395 22.6398 
7 0.0531 12.6461 3.4407 57.7098 4.1841 22.0194 
8 0.0553 11.7328 3.2341 59.3284 5.1274 20.5774 
9 0.0595 13.4280 2.8556 60.2508 5.2075 18.2582 
10 0.0630 15.8767 2.5531 57.7735 4.7134 19.0833 
Variance Decomposition of LP: 
1 0.0227 0.0000 61.9942 28.1670 3.3735 6.4653 
2 0.0403 3.1349 22.1566 43.0402 21.5561 10.1121 
3 0.0496 2.4158 14.8985 44.9420 27.0109 10.7328 
4 0.0523 5.3410 13.5514 45.0460 26.2696 9.7920 
5 0.0658 12.3238 8.7898 51.4219 17.1980 10.2665 
6 0.0916 9.2714 4.6879 62.6881 12.1998 11.1528 
7 0.1118 6.3066 3.1510 70.0208 10.3692 10.1525 
8 0.1300 5.5133 2.4249 75.2757 9.2213 7.5648 
9 0.1450 5.7079 2.3631 77.3419 8.4853 6.1018 
10 0.1563 6.5154 2.3773 76.9673 8.5124 5.6275 
Variance Decomposition of LM2: 
1 0.0842 0.0000 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
2 0.1137 0.8124 0.1372 94.7236 0.6086 3.7182 
3 0.1247 0.6799 0.1867 94.4845 1.2028 3.4462 
4 0.1452 0.5856 1.3035 93.5859 1.2179 3.3070 
5 0.1771 0.3975 1.0310 92.8206 2.3498 3.4011 
6 0.1986 0.3290 0.8304 92.0683 3.6028 3.1696 
7 0.2210 0.9717 0.9228 91.0051 4.5388 2.5617 
8 0.2422 2.0833 0.9680 90.2521 4.5538 2.1428 
9 0.2590 3.4716 0.9536 89.1470 4.2875 2.1404 
10 0.2702 3.9916 1.0452 88.8164 4.0895 2.0573 
Variance Decomposition of LIR: 
1 0.0571 0.0000 0.0000 14.3976 85.6025 0.0000 
2 0.0719 6.9186 0.4731 9.4807 57.7364 25.3912 
3 0.0999 30.1176 0.3580 17.1789 30.9919 21.3536 
4 0.1137 30.8806 2.7143 13.8864 31.1910 21.3277 
5 0.1198 27.9331 3.7064 16.5403 32.0766 19.7437 
6 0.1358 28.5856 2.8861 24.2577 25.0101 19.2605 
7 0.1445 31.0194 2.8227 22.7457 22.9131 20.4992 
8 0.1520 29.1376 4.8267 20.7771 21.1207 24.1379 
9 0.1541 29.2481 6.3060 20.2067 20.5826 23.6565 
10 0.1600 29.2929 5.8931 19.7514 19.9711 25.0916 
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Variance Decomposition of LER: 
1 0.0502 0.0000 0.0000 38.7914 2.4053 58.8033 
2 0.0687 2.1725 5.1342 58.8360 1.2914 32.5659 
3 0.0863 2.9544 9.9240 58.5342 1.7069 26.8805 
4 0.1047 4.9367 7.8334 59.3566 1.5862 26.2871 
5 0.1305 5.5025 5.0444 56.6755 7.3453 25.4322 
6 0.1450 4.6916 4.0988 54.6727 13.2973 23.2397 
7 0.1597 7.6006 3.4951 53.4421 15.9834 19.4788 
8 0.1782 15.1621 2.8072 49.2959 13.2914 19.4435 
9 0.1952 20.7069 2.6546 42.5219 11.3359 22.7807 
10 0.2023 21.6464 2.9957 39.7409 11.3180 24.2990 
Notes: Cholesky Ordering: LM2, LIR, LER, LP, LRGDP. We have used different orderings of the 
variables under concerned, but the findings are robust to changes (see Footnote 17).  
 
 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix of the reduced form VAR residuals 
 LRGDP LP LM2 LIR LER 
LRGDP 1 0.0275 0.4636 -0.3961 -0.5252 
LP  1 0.2786 0.2530 -0.2469 
LM2   1 -0.1237 -0.6829 
LIR    1 0.1831 
LER     1 
 
 
Variance decomposition analysis  
 
Table 7 shows the relative importance of each shock in terms of their contribution to the 
forecast-error variance of each variable. It is seen that money variable is the most crucial 
policy variable in explaining both RGDP and price level, both in the short- and long-run. 
While money variable explains more than 32 and 28 percent of total variation in output 
and price respectively in the short-run, it explains more than 50 percent of total variation 
in both variables in the long-run. Exchange rate shock explains about 27 percent of 
forecast-error variance of RGDP variation in the first year. However, it explains about 20 
percent of forecast-error variance of RGDP variation in the remaining time horizon. Price 
and interest rate shocks explain less than 6 percent of the forecast-error variance of 
RGDP for the entire time horizon.  
 
Looking at the forecast-error variance of price, even though interest rate’s contribution 
relative to other policy variables is not so high as that of money variable in the short-run, 
its contribution to price is still relatively high in the medium-term, which explains about 
20 percent on price (from second to fourth years). For the whole horizon, the percentage 
of the variance in price explained by RGDP and exchange rate is less than 16 percent. 
 
Consistent with the Granger causality test, money variable emerges as an exogenous 
variable as over 88 percent of the forecast-error variance is explained by its own shock at 
all horizons. It is found that output, money and exchange rate are significant in explaining 
interest rate in the medium- and long-terms. On the other hand, money variable is crucial 
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in explaining exchange rate for the whole horizons. In contrast, RGDP, price and interest 
rate shocks are the least important to explain exchange rate, either in the short- or long-
run.  
 
Correlation Matrix of Reduced-form VAR Residuals 
 
In order to examine the robustness of the variance decomposition results, which would be 
sensitive on different orderings of the variables, we resorted to testing the correlation of 
reduced-form VAR residuals. Table 8 shows the correlation matrix of the reduced-form 
VECM residuals based on the ordering of variables, namely: money, interest rate, 
exchange rate, price and RGDP.  The elements of the correlation matrix between these 
variables are relatively low, implying that the contemporaneous feedback is not a 
problem. These correlations suggest that the ordering of the variables in a Choleski 
decomposition is not of any major concern.  
 
Impulse response function analysis  
 
The study extends the analysis to impulse response function (IRF). Based on this 
analysis, a one-standard deviation shock to one variable not only directly influences 
another variable, but also the shock is also transmitted to other endogenous variables via 
the dynamic lag structure of the system. This technique traces the impact of a shock to 
one of the innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables.  
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the results of IRF analysis for RGDP and price, respectively. 
The response of RGDP to a shock in price is negative, which is statistically not 
significant effect for the entire horizon. A shock to money variable evokes a positive and 
significant response in RGDP for the first five years and the effect dies out quickly after 
that.  Response of output to shocks in both interest rate and exchange rate, though 
negative are statistically not significant.  
 
Looking at the response of price to shocks in policy variables, we note that a one standard 
deviation shock in real output gives rise to a positive and significant response in price for 
the first two years, which decreases, becoming negative and eventually dying out. A 
shock in money variable evokes a positive and significant response in price, which 
decreases after the fifth year. In contrast, we do not observe any significant responses in 
price to shocks in interest rate and exchange rate for the entire time horizon.  
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Figure 1: The Results of Impulse Response Function Analysis for LRGDP   
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Figure 2: The Results of Impulse Response Function Analysis for Prices  
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
There are no studies on monetary policy transmission mechanism in Tonga, Although 
monetary policy transmission mechanism in developed countries, as well as in many 
developing countries, documented in the growing body of empirical literature, is well 
understood and clear, it is not clear how monetary policy transmission mechanism works 
in Tonga. This paper seeks to fills the gap by undertaking as study on the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism in Tonga. 
 
Tonga’s financial sector is small.  Its money market, where short-term interest rate is 
determined, is shallow. Further, there are no secondary markets for short-and long- term 
debt securities.  The study findings show that monetary aggregate in Tonga is more 
important than short-term interest rate as a channel in transmitting impulses from the 
monetary sector to the real sector. The significant responses of both real output and price 
to money variable further reinforce our argument that policy makers should target 
monetary aggregate as policy instrument for controlling real activity and for price 
stabilization in Tonga. These are consistent with the findings of studies in other parts of 
the developing world that in countries where the money market is relatively undeveloped, 
the money market will not be the principal conduit of monetary policy shocks. 
 
The study findings should be useful for policy makers involved in the design and 
implementation of monetary policy so as to ensure the maximum effect on investment 
and economic growth. With further economic liberalization and development of financial 
market in Tonga, the channels through which monetary policy works will continue to 
evolve.  As such, the question of how monetary policy is transmitted to the real sector in 
Tonga would be of continuing interest to researchers and policy makers, especially when 
a longer time series of data become available, after some efflux of time, for a more 
detailed analysis of the impact of liberalization on the monetary transmission mechanism. 
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